LABOR LAW-COMMON MARKET-PUBLIC POLICY REGARDING
PERSONAL CONDUCT MAY ACT AS A RESTRAINT ON THE FREE
MOVEMENT OF LABOR IN THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY.

Plaintiff, of Dutch nationality, arrived at Gatwick Airport in England with
the intention of taking employment with the Church of Scientology of California at its headquarters in East Grinstead, England.' Upon being questioned by
the immigration service,2 plaintiff was refused entry because the government
of the United Kingdom considers the activities of the Church of Scientology
to be socially harmful' and, as a result, will not authorize the entry of a person
who works for, or is seeking employment with, this organization., Plaintiff
sought entry alleging that a Member State of the European Economic Community (EEC), in basing a measure on grounds of public policy in respect of
I The Church of Scientology was established in the United States and functions in the United
Kingdom through a college at East Grinstead, Sussex.
2 The United Kingdom vests its immigration officers with the power to refuse entry by virtue
of section 4(1) of the Immigration Act of 1971. In addition, rule 65 of the "Statement of Immigration Rules for Control on Entry" reads:
Any passenger except the wife or child under 18 of a person settled in the United
Kingdom may be refused leave to enter on the ground that the exclusion is conducive
to the public good where:
(a) the Secretary of State has personally so directed, or
(b) from information available to the Immigration Officer it seems right to
refuse leave to enter on that ground-if, for example, in the light of the
passenger's conduct, character, or associations, it is undesirable to give him
leave to enter.
3 On July 25, 1968, the Minister of Health made a statement in the House of Commons in
response to a question concerning the British Government's position on Scientology which included
the following remarks:
Scientology is a pseudo-philosophical cult. . . . The Government are satisfied having
reviewed all the available evidence that Scientology is socially harmful. It alienates
members of families from each other and attributes squalid and disgraceful motives to
all who oppose it; its authoritarian principles and practice are a potential menace to the
personality and well-being of those so deluded as to become its followers; above all its
methods can be a serious danger to the health of those who submit to them. There is
evidence that children are now being indoctrinated. There is no power, under existing
law to prohibit the practice of Scientology; but the Government have concluded that it
is so objectionable that it would be right to take all steps within their power to curb its
growth. . . . Foreign nationals come here to study Scientology and to work at the socalled college in East Grinstead. The Government can prevent this under existing law
• . . and have decided to do so. The following steps are being taken with immediate
effect:
(e) Work permits and employment vouchers will not be issued to foreign nationals
.. . for work at a Scientology establishment.
Written Answer 163, H.C. No. 1459/1967/68.
1 There are no legal restrictions upon the practice of Scientology in the United Kingdom nor
upon British nationals (with certain immaterial exceptions) who desire either to be members of or
to work with the Church of Scientology.
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individual conduct, was not entitled to take into account as a matter of personal
conduct the fact that the individual is or has been associated with some body
or organization whose activities the Member State considers to be contrary to
the public good but which are not unlawful in that State. Plaintiff also argued
that the State was not entitled to take into account the fact that the individual
intended to take employment in the Member State with such a body or organization when the Member State placed no restrictions upon its own nationals
who wish to take similar employment with such a body or organization. Plaintiff initiated an action before the Chancery Division of the High Court of the
United Kingdom where a stay was ordered while the European Court of Justice
interpreted the relevant provisions of the EEC Charter.' Held, question answered in the affirmative. Article 48 of the EEC Treaty of Rome6 and article
3(1) of Directive 64/221 are to be interpreted as meaning that a Member
State, in imposing restrictions based on policy grounds, is entitled to take into
account, as a matter of personal conduct of the individual concerned, the fact

I The Vice Chancellor of the Chancery Division submitted three questions to the Court of Justice
of the European Communities for a preliminary hearing. The third question stated:
3. whether upon the proper interpretation of Article 48 of the Treaty Establishing
the European Economic Community and Article 3 of Directive 64/221/EEC a Member
State in the performance of its duty to base a measure taken on grounds of public
policy exclusively on the personal conduct of the individual concerned is entitled to
take into account as matters of personal conduct (a) the fact that the individual is or
has been associated with some body or organization the activities of which the Member
State considers contrary to the public good but which are not unlawful in that State;
(b) the fact that the individual intends to take employment in the Member State with
such a body or organization it being the case that no restrictions are placed upon
nationals of the Member State who wish to take similar employment with such a body
or organization.
Such preliminary rulings are taken pursuant to the Treaty Establishing the European Economic
Community, March 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. II (effective Jan. 1, 1958), art. 177 [hereinafter cited
as EEC Treaty]. This marked the first time that the High Court of the United Kingdom had asked
the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling pursuant to article 177.
EEC Treaty, article 48 concerns the free movement of workers. Section 2 states:
Such freedom of movement shall entail the abolition of any discrimination based on
nationality between workers of the Member States as regards employment, remuneration and other conditions of work and employment.
Section 3 states:
(3) It shall entail the right, subject to limitations justified on grounds of public policy,
public security or public health:
(a) to accept offers of employment actually made;
(b) to move freely within the territory of Member States for this purpose;
(c) to stay in a Member State for the purpose of employment in accordance with the
provisions governing the employment of nationals of that State laid down by law,
regulation, or administrative action.
Directive 64/221, art. 3(l), EEC Council, Apr. 4, 1964, 56 J. Off. Com. Eur. 850 (1964). I
CCH COM. MKT. REP. § 1412.15 [hereinafter cited as Directive 64/221]. Directive 64/221 states
that "[mleasures taken on grounds of public policy or of public security shall be based exclusively
on the personal conduct of the individual concerned."
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that the individual is associated with some body or organization the activities
of which the Member State considers socially harmful even though no like
restriction is placed upon nationals of the said Member State who wish to take
similar employment with these same bodies or organizations. Van Duyn v.
Home Office, Ct. of Justice of the Eur. Comm. (case 41/74), 15 Com. Mkt.
L.R. 1, 2 CCH COM. MKT. REP.
8283 (Dec. 4, 1974).
One of the fundamental principles of the EEC Treaty establishing the European Economic Community is the abolishment, as between Member States, of
obstacles to freedom of movement for workers More specifically, the EEC
Treaty confers an enforceable right upon an individual of a Member State to
enter another Member State as a worker subject only to limitations imposed
by the receiving Member State in furtherance of its public policy, public security, or public health.' However, Directive 64/221,10 which was issued in an
effort to provide a minimum degree of uniformity," narrowed the potential
scope of such limitations by providing that these limitations must not be invoked to serve the economic ends of the Member State but rather must be
based solely on the personal conduct of the individual concerned" as determined by an objective evaluation by authorities of the Member State. 3
The EEC Treaty espouses the concept that "[tihe heart of the idea of free
movement is equal treatment with nationals."" As a result, every worker of
every Member State is entitled to work in the other Member States "under the
same conditions as their Nationals.""5 The goal of abolition of all discrimination on grounds of nationality is achieved under the EEC Treaty by regulations
and directives, the main regulation being 1612/68,6 which prohibits a Member
State from subjecting a worker to conditions that do not apply to their nationO

EEC Treaty, art. 3(c).

Id. art. 48(3).
Is See note 7 supra.
O

1 Poole, Mobility of Labour and Job Opportunities, 122 NEw L.J. 1147 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as Poole].
1 Id.
13 Turack, Freedom of Movement and Travel Documents in Community Law, 17 BUFFALO L.
REv. 435, 437 (1968). A German court held that although an Italian worker, who had been given
a German work permit, did not meet the requirements of public order and health as prescribed by
German law, he had "nevertheless complied with this concept under its broader definition as
understood in the other continental countries, and thus could not be deported." Common Market
Cases and Rulings-Movement of Labor; Competition, 5 VA. J. INT'L L. 229, 230 n.5 (1965).
" EEC Treaty, art. 48, para. 1002.13.
Is Id.

Is Regulation 1612/68, art. 3(I), EEC Council, Oct. 19, 1968, L257 J. Off. Com. Eur. I (1968),
I CCH CoM. MKT. REP. § 1031(c)(1) [hereinafter cited as Regulation 1612/681. Regulation
1612/68 states:
Within the framework of this regulation, legislative, regulatory, or administrative
provisions, or administrative practices of a Member State are prohibited:
-where they restrict employment offers and applications, access to employment, and
the holding of jobs by foreigners, or make them subject to conditions that do not apply
to their nationals . . ..
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als. 17 Thus, nationals of any Member State are given equal rights to apply for
an employment vacancy in any other Member State."8 In addition, in cases of
doubt, the measures implementing article 48 of the EEC Treaty must be interpreted in a manner that will not impair the legal position of migrant workers. 9
In determining the scope of public policy under article 48(3) of the EEC

Treaty, 0 it is up to the national and Community courts, not local officials, to

decide whether any grounds for limiting free movement exist."' The concept of
public policy must be applied by the court in each case." Since the adoption
of the EEC rules, local administrative authorities no longer have the power to
exercise their discretion in determining public policy. 23 Public policy in article

48(3) is a concept of Community law and is not necessarily to be identified with
any similar concept in any of the national systems of the European Economic
Community.24 However, all of these considerations must still be maintained
within the framework of Directive 64/221 ,2 which requires that measures taken
on the ground of public policy be based exclusively on the personal conduct of
the individual concerned. In addition, when invoking public policy, these
21
limitations must be restrictively interpreted.
2
The Court's holding in Van Duyn 1 allows a Member State to consider as a
matter of personal conduct the association of an individual with a body or

organization, the activities of which the Member State considers as contrary
to the public good but which are not unlawful in that State. In so holding, the

Court determined that "present" association in an organization reflects "participation" in the activities of that organization and thus, it is considered part
of his personal conduct within the meaning of article 3 of Directive 64/221.29
17 Id.
19 Poole, supra note 11, at 1147.
However, the EEC Treaty, art. 48, para. 1007.01, provided that the free movement of workers
would be introduced only gradually in the course of a transition period and the final stage of this
period was reached with the adoption of Regulation 1612/68. See note 16 supra.
"1 Nonmenmacher v. Bestuur der Sociale Verzekerirgs, Ct. of Justice of the Eur. Comm. (case
92/63), June 9, 1964, 10 Recueil 557, 3 Com. Mkt. L.R. 338 (1964).
, See note 6 supra.
21 Jett, The Free Movement of Labor in the EEC, 8 TEx. INT'L L.F. 375, 385 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Jett].
22 Judgment of Oct. 26, 1962, Verwaltungsgerricht, Berlin (case VG IA 98/62), 1 CCH COM.
MKT. REP. § 1-2.82.
w Id.
24 Judgment of Nov. 14, 1966, Landgericht, Wiesbaden (case 4 T 427/66), 7 Com. Mkt. L.R.
239, 242 (1968). See Jett, supra note 21, at 385.
2 Directive 64/221, supra note 7.
26 Id.
" Sotgui v. Deutsche Bundespost, Ct. of Justice of the Eur. Comm. (case 152/73), Feb. 12, 1974,
*2 Recueil 153, 2 CCH COM. MKT. REP. § 8257. A limitation "must not be given weight which
goes beyond the object for which the clause of limitation had been inserted." Id. at 159, 2 CCH
COM. MKT. REP. at 9165-4.1.
21 Ct. of Justice of the Eur. Comm. (case 41/74), 15 Com. Mkt. L.R. 1, 2 CCH Com. MKT.
REP. 8283 (Dec. 4, 1974).
" Directive 64/221, supra note 7.
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The holding further allows an area of discretion for the Member States in
which to determine if personal conduct is violative of their policy. According
to the Court, this is true even though the Member State is not required to make
the activities unlawful in that State.
There are several weaknesses in the Court's determination concerning an
individual's "association" with an organization which a Member State considers as being contrary to that State's public good. First, there is the differentiation between "present" association and "past" association. Neither "past"
associations with an organization nor previous convictions of crimes can, in
general, justify a decision refusing an individual the right to move freely within
the Community. Thus, the Court held that "present" association is part of
an individual's personal conduct, and Miss van Duyn was an active member
of the Church of Scientology upon her arrival in England. However, this leaves
open the question of whether an individual who intends to take employment
with an organization which a Member State considers adverse to the public
good, but who is not presently associated with that organization, can be denied
entry to the Member State. For instance, would the results have been different
if Miss van Duyn was not, nor had ever been, associated with the Church of
Scientology?
In this regard, the United Kingdom's policy is not to allow any individual
of another Member State leave to enter for the purpose of taking employment
with the Church of Scientology." However, this policy is not within the interpretation of "personal conduct" as given by the Court. The Court only spoke
in relation to "present" association. Therefore, it would appear that an individual who is purely seeking employment, but who is in no way associated with
the objectionable organization, should be permitted to enter the Member State
and take up employment with that organization. Employment with an organization does not necessitate "identification" with that organization's aims and
thus would not amount to an association with that organization.
Finally, the Court in Van Duyn allowed a Member State, on grounds of
public policy, to prevent a national of another Member State from taking
gainful employment within its territory with an organization deemed contrary
to the public good when no similar restriction is placed upon its own nationals.
The Court's rationale was based upon the limitations, justified on grounds of
public policy, in article 48(3).2 However, the Court failed to resolve the issue
by conveniently neglecting to state what limitations they used and how they
applied them. Somewhat more convincing in the Court's rationale is its reliance
on the principle that a State has a duty to readmit its own nationals 3 and
3

Id.

3' See note 3 supra.
s See note 6 supra.
3 "Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his
country." Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 13(2), G.A. Res. 217 (III), U.N. Doc.
A/810 at 71 (1948).
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that a national shall not be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own
country.34 Although this is the extent of the Court's rationale for its holding
on this issue, it may be presumed that because of the right of a national to enter
his own country, there should be an element of discrimination by a State in
favor of its own nationals so far as entry into the State is concerned. Obviously,
this is true to a certain extent. It cannot be denied that a Member State would
be justified in refusing to admit a drug addict who is a national of another
Member State even though it would be obligated to admit a drug addict who
was one of its own nationals.3 But this is simply a gloss by the Court and a
closer look reveals the inadequacies in the Court's rationale.
At this point it is helpful to recall several important points. First, a fundamental principle of the EEC Treaty is to establish the freedom of movement
of workers between Member States." A second principle is grounded in the
desire to abolish any discrimination on grounds of nationality.37 Finally, the
basis for invoking public policy in article 48(3) is the personal conduct of the
individual concerned." However, this last concept is an autonomous concept
created by the EEC Treaty, thus requiring interpretation first in the context of
Community law, with national criteria becoming relevant only to its application. If it were otherwise, a Member State could arbitrarily set limits to the
interpretation of public policy resulting in a variety of obligations and restraints
upon the freedom of movement of workers among the various Member States.
This would turn the concept of freedom of movement of workers into a complete mockery, and yet this is exactly what the Court is permitting because of
its failure to construct guidelines or establish adequate restrictions.
The keystone to the freedom of movement of workers is uniformity. As
stated in Sotgui v. Deutsche Bundespost:
Freedom of movement must be regarded as one of the fundamental liberties
guaranteed to workers in the member states, the exception which results
from paragraph 4 of Article 48, ought to be interpreted at the same time
strictly and in a uniform manner in each of these States, which excludes the
ability, for this purpose, of referring to national criteria. What would in effect
be the substance of freedom of movement if it were dependant [sic] on one
State or another automatically invoking in some way or other the exemption
of paragraph 4 in entrusting to a public administration in the light of its
internal law, the task of carrying out such activity as seemed to it to answer
to a requirement of general interest?3'
'4 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 12(4), G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N.
GAOR Supp. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
" Directive 64/221, art. 4 and annex B(I).
36 See note 8 supra.
" See note 6 supra.
" See note 7 supra.
" Sotgui v. Deutsche Bundespost, Ct. of Justice of the Eur. Comm. (case 152/73), Feb. 12,
1974, 2 Recueil 153, 169, 2 CCH COM. MKT. REP. § 8257 9165-9.
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The problem of discrimination on the part of a Member State on grounds
of public policy becomes particularly acute when the activities involved are
considered contrary to the public good but are not considered as unlawful, thus
entitling its own nationals to be employed by the undesirable organization. As
stated earlier, it is understandable that limited discrimination should be allowed, as in the case of a Member State admitting a drug addict into that State
if the addict is a national of that State. In such a situation the activity is
uniformly considered as illegal in all the Member States. But the situation is
different when the activity is not unlawful within the Member State. In applying Community law, if the personal conduct is acceptable when exercised by a
national of a Member State, then that conduct must also be acceptable by that
Member State when exercised by a national of a different Member State. This
meets with the spirit of uniformity and nondiscrimination as required by the
EEC Treaty. 0 Thus, a Member State is not entitled to take into account, as
matters of personal conduct, employment by an organization whose activities
are considered to be against the public good but are not considered as being
unlawful in that State when its own nationals are free to take up similar
employment.
The Court in Van Duyn completely failed in establishing judicial standards
with which to measure personal conduct in its application to public policy.
However, since this case consisted of a determination by the European Court
of Justice of the questions referred to it by the Chancery Division of the High
Court of the United Kingdom, the outcome of the case is to be determined by
the Chancery Division of the High Court, where the inadequacies of the European Court of Justice opinion may be corrected. Thus, the final outcome of
Miss van Duyn's case is yet to be determined.
William A. O'Dell
40

See note 6 supra.

